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Abstract 
Swiss theologian Emil Brunner (1899-1966) developed a liberal Protestant 
theology of the family, contrary to the more traditional biblical views of his compatriot 
Karl Barth.  Brunner treated the family as a natural order of creation, alongside the state 
and economy.  The family has a natural monogamous structure and a built-in set of 
spousal and parental rights and duties that cannot be invaded by other social spheres 
or reconstructed by family members or liberal reformers.  The state has to protect and 
enforce these family rights and duties as a matter of justice, but Christians should honor 
them spontaneously in expression of agapic love.  Brunner prized children and their 
rights, and he called the union of husband, wife, and child, a “trinitarian union” built on 
the foundation of mutual natural attraction and as a reflection of the triune Godhead.  
But he insisted that marital sex was a unique expression of love not just a means to a 
procreative end, and he firmly rejected as unrealistic the procreative perfectionism of 
some parts of the Catholic tradition. A marital couple without children was a complete 
family, he believed, just as a widow(er) or divorcee with children remained a complete 
family. 
 
Keywords:  Emil Brunner; Karl Barth; marriage; family; children; sex; creation; 
natural order; natural law; man and woman; sex; love; trinity; church and state; 
economy; natural appetite  
 
Biographical Introduction 
Emil Brunner (1899–1966) was one of the great European Protestant minds of 
the twentieth century. He was educated in Switzerland, served in the Swiss military, and 
then was a pastor in Zurich before embarking on a distinguished career as a professor 
of theology at the University of Zurich. He was an active participant in the World Council 
of Churches and the global Moral Re-armament Movement and stood at distinguished 
lecterns throughout the world.  
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Brunner drew deeply on the writings of his Protestant forebears Martin Luther 
and John Calvin, and he was strongly influenced by the teachings of Danish theologian 
Søren Kierkegaard and German philosopher Edmund Husserl, among others. A 
staunch defender of biblical Christianity, Brunner resisted theological liberals like Paul 
Tillich, who saw God as “the ground of being” and understood revelation to be 
necessarily a mere symbol that points beyond itself. Yet Brunner was also a staunch 
defender of natural law, natural theology, and natural reason, which he defended 
against many other Protestants, notably his famous Swiss contemporary Karl Barth, 
who declared his famous “Nein!” against him. Brunner believed in salvation by faith in 
Christ, but he also insisted that Christians—and all others—could understand God’s will 
for their personal and collective lives through the natural law that God had “written on 
their hearts” and through the natural order that God had created, even though it was 
corrupted by human sin. 
Brunner was a prolific scholar, whose writings circulated widely in Europe, North 
America, Japan, and South Korea. In his three-volume Dogmatics,1 he laid out the 
doctrinal fundamentals of Christian theology with a strong emphasis on the “I-Thou” 
relationship between God and humanity, whereby God equips and calls each person to 
respond to God and divine law. In his Divine Imperative,2 he analyzed how God’s 
commands for human living, set out in scripture, conscience, reason, and nature, 
provide the foundation for the flourishing of human personhood and social institutions. 
Man in Revolt3 laid out the causes and consequences of defiance of these divine 
imperatives, and The Mediator4 analyzed the pathway to salvation through and in 
Christ. Brunner wrote biblical commentaries and other technical works on religion. He 
also left several important books on social ethics, not least his Justice and the Social 
Order,5 Eros and Agape,6 and his Gifford Lectures, titled Christianity and Civilization.7   
 
† Don S. Browning passed away in 2010. This text is drawn in part from an unpublished manuscript on 
“Christian Marriage and Modern Marriage Law” that the two authors were working on at his death, and it 
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in his From Culture Wars to Common Ground, 2d ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2000), 242–43; and in Marriage and Modernization (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 140–
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The Natural-Rational Foundation of the Marital Family 
In a number of these works, Brunner addressed themes of sex, marriage, and 
family. He started by distinguishing three kinds of human interests stemming from what 
he called the “psychophysical nature” of human beings. These interests are the human 
need for (1) sex, intimacy, and offspring; (2) labor, acquisition, and economic well-being; 
and (3) safety, security, and control over the contingencies of life. In Brunner’s view, 
these basic human interests are fostered and fulfilled by different spheres of society: (1) 
sex and procreation by marriage and the family; (2) acquisition and economic well-being 
by labor and the market; and (3) safety and control by the state and its laws. This was a 
deliberate variation on the famous “three estates theory” (Drei-Stände-Lehre) of Luther 
and other early Protestants, who had postulated the family, state, and church as the 
founding institutions of the created natural order.8  Brunner treated the church as a 
distinct voluntary (not a natural) estate, as we shall see, and he insisted that the 
economy was its own separate sphere rooted in the natural order. 
Brunner believed that these three basic psychophysical interests and the 
accompanying social spheres of family, economy, and state can be known and 
analyzed by human reason. The goods toward which these interests are oriented, and 
the inner logic or rationality that identifies them, have their roots in natural law and the 
created natural order. “These forms of community . . . are all independent of faith, and 
of the love which flows from faith,” Brunner wrote. “This does not mean that their 
significance and their true nature can be rightly known outside the sphere of faith.”  But 
it does mean that all human beings, of whatever faith or nonfaith, have some basic 
understanding of these natural interests and human impulses toward the different 
spheres of communal life. These spheres both reveal and “conceal within themselves 
the Divine orders of creation,” which comprise God’s original design and intention for 
the fulfillment and flourishing of all humans, said Brunner. Virtually every human 
civilization, therefore, develops these three institutions, however variant in form and 
function.9     
The orders of creation can be seen in the primeval commands described in the 
creation story of Genesis 1 and 2, Brunner argued. There we read that “male and 
female” are separated by God yet called to join together as “two in one flesh,” in order to 
“be fruitful and multiply” (the order of the family). Humans are called to work and to “fill 
the earth and subdue it” (the order of the economy). And humans are called to “have 
dominion over the earth” and rule over all creation, but also “dress and keep it” (the 
order of the state). Furthermore, Brunner argued, these natural forms of community—
the family, the economy, and the state—constitute something like divine training schools 
for higher and more fulfilling forms of life that God wills in creation. He believed that, 
from the perspective of human reason, these spheres function to articulate and meet 
 
8 See chapter 12 herein on Martin Luther.  
9 Divine Imperative, 333–36; Dogmatics 2:26–31. 
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basic human needs. But from the perspective of faith, they are gifts of God even though 
they are changed and broken by sin.10 
Brunner offers a good example of a natural law theory rooted in what some moral 
philosophers and theologians call the “premoral goods” of marriage and family life.11 In 
this view, premoral goods are to be distinguished from morality.  For instance, if 
someone says, “This water is good,” she is not saying it is morally good. She is making 
a premoral or nonmoral judgment; she is saying it is clean, has a nice refreshing taste, 
and is likely healthy to drink. If she is a mother interested in her children’s health and 
then claims that the mayor and the commissioner of sanitation should provide clean 
water for her offspring, she is making a moral judgment. And if she says that these 
authorities should provide clean water equally for everyone—not just the elite or the 
wealthy, and not even just for her own family—she is making a moral statement about 
justice or fairness. But notice, although water is not itself a moral good, it is a premoral 
good, one without moral valence in itself. Water does not have a will and cannot act—
either morally or immorally. We never say, “Water is moral.”  But we do say, “Mary is 
moral; she is a good person; she does that right thing.” 
The distinction between premoral and fully moral judgments runs throughout our 
everyday moral and legal discourse, whether we are talking about water or talking about 
Brunner’s psychophysical goods of sex and procreation, economic well-being, or 
security and order. Brunner’s three sets of interests or goods are not moral goods 
because it is entirely possible to pursue and attain them in totally ruthless and immoral 
ways. In fact, in the covenant theology that Brunner developed on the strength of 
biblical teachings, it was precisely the purpose of the covenantal organization of the 
spheres of family, market, and state to bring moral order to the pursuit of these premoral 
interests or goods. Arriving at an analysis of the reality and centrality of these goods 
and interests was, according to Brunner, the function of natural law. It was the task of 
covenant and its overall narrative about the purposes of life and divine ends of life to 
give moral organization to these interests, both internally to specific persons and 
externally in relation to the spheres of society.  
Justice and Love in the Family 
In laying out his theory of the morality or moral goods of marriage and family life, 
Brunner recited with appreciation the three goods of marriage identified by St. 
Augustine and the medieval scholastics: children (proles), fidelity (fides), and 
sacramental stability (sacramentum).12 He also echoed Isidore of Seville’s formula, 
repeated by the Protestant reformers, that marriage served the mutual love and support 
 
10 Divine Imperative, 336–37. 
11 See the views of premoral goods in the neo-Thomistic moral theologian Louis Janssens and the nearly 
identical concept of the nonmoral good in American moral philosopher William Frankena in Don S. 
Browning, Christian Ethics and the Moral Psychologies (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
2006), 190–220. 
12 See chapter 4 herein on St. Augustine of Hippo. 
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of husband and wife; the mutual procreation and nurture of children; and the mutual 
protection of both spouses from sexual sin.13  But Brunner ultimately developed his own 
formula of the goods or ends of marriage in terms of love and justice, and he insisted 
that children be viewed not just as a product or end of marriage, but as an integral part 
of a marital family.  
“Marriage and the family are communities . . . in which justice lies most open to 
the influence of love,” Brunner wrote. “In true marriage and the family, a synthesis of 
three highly heterogeneous principles becomes possible—natural love (eros), justice, 
and Christian love (agape).” When marriage is viewed only as a natural institution, the 
focus is on the sexual body, erotic love, and contractual commitments, and when those 
die the marriage often ends by separation or divorce. Here justice sounds in the cold 
calculus of the courts, with battles over divorce, child custody, marital property, and 
more. Such minimal justice of the family is critical to maintain and inevitably needed in 
our broken world, for people of faith and no faith alike. Christian husbands and wives, 
parents and children, need to respect this natural order of justice in the state at 
minimum and use its institutions when spiritual expedients no longer avail them.14  
 But a Christian marriage is ideally also a divine union of covenantal fidelity that 
is founded and focused on the enduring and sacrificial form of love called agape. “Only 
where husband and wife recognize absolute equality of worth in each other, and strive 
to express that equality” in all that they do for and with each other is “the law of justice 
fulfilled” in a Christian marriage. Yes, St. Paul says: “The husband has a right to his 
wife, the wife has a right to her husband,” which indicates their mutual rights to sex, 
nurture, protection, forgiveness, support, and fidelity. But in a Christian marriage, built 
on agape, such rights and duties, fidelity and sacrifice will emerge “spontaneously, 
without the imperative of justice,” without the guidance and governance of church or 
state, and without tribunals that calculate these rights and duties and the costs of their 
breach. Love and justice gradually grow and come together in a Christian marriage 
voluntarily, in as perfect a harmony as is possible in a world still marred by sin. Brunner 
maintained the traditional biblical teaching that the husband is the head of the wife 
within the home, though not necessarily in society. But he insisted that this was not “a 
degradation of the woman” but a protection of her “true dignity.” And this was not an 
invitation for a man to dominate his wife and children, but an injunction to practice 
enduring fidelity and sacrifice for his wife and family, much as Christ did for the church 
and its members.15 
Men and women are created with different sexual bodies, in no small part in 
order to come together as “two in one flesh” and to “be fruitful and multiply.” This does 
not mean that every sexual act has to have a procreative intent or end. Brunner rejected 
 
13 See John Witte Jr., “The Goods and Goals of Marriage,” in John Wall, Don S. Browning, William J. 
Doherty, and Stephen Post, eds., Marriage, Health, and the Professions (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002), 49–89. 
14 Justice, 142–43; Divine Imperative, 350–55. 
15 Justice, 14–145; Eros und Liebe, 12–14; Divine Imperative, 356–9, 373–83.  
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what he thought to be the “unrealistic demands” of procreative perfectionism taught by 
parts of the Christian tradition.16 “Sexual intercourse is intended by the Creator not only 
as a means of procreation, but also as a means of expressing the love of married 
people for each other.” Sexual intimacy of itself is a perennial and “permanent need,” a 
“characteristic of human life” for almost all adult human beings, save those unique few 
who are called to celibacy. Sex is there for marital couples to embrace and enjoy with 
each other, even if and when they cannot have children. Nonetheless, children are an 
essential natural and spiritual good of the marital family, said Brunner, and a blessing if 
they are produced by the sexual union. “The religious view tallies with that of biology: 
the sexual apparatus [of human bodies] ‘serves’ procreation.” Children are endemic to 
the institution of marriage, Brunner insisted, even if they are not part of every marriage, 
let alone every act of sexual intimacy between married couples. As such, “procreation, 
the root of all human life, is withdrawn from private judgment. All capricious, self-serving 
prevention of procreation in marriage is a destruction of the divine order.”17  
Brunner seemed to be concerned here primarily with abortion, because he said 
later that a “child has a right to be born”—both a natural and a divine right. “The dignity 
of the child is equal to the dignity of the parent; the primal right of the child as a person 
is equal to theirs. The child has a sacred right against its parents which in some cases 
must be protected by the community”—not only in cases of abortion or infanticide, but in 
instances of chronic need, neglect, deprivation, or abuse. Here, the state must 
sometimes intervene, with coercion if needed. Indeed, Brunner wrote, the legal 
protection of children’s rights by the modern state “is the fruit of Christianity.”18 
Trinitarian Family Recognition. Brunner described the father-mother-child 
relationship within a Christian family in Trinitarian terms. “All members belong to each 
other—the father to the child, the child to the father, the mother to the child, the child to 
the mother, just as the husband belongs to the wife, and the wife to each other.”  Each 
member of the family has his or her own office and function in the marital family. But 
there is also a fundamental unity in this diversity of domestic persons and offices. And 
when this unity is fully expressed and respected, “a real family is the perfect example of 
the cooperation of love and justice.”19 
This Trinitarian family relationship is not only a faint reflection of the Trinitarian 
Godhead, but also a direct expression of the “natural recognition” of father, mother, and 
child. Historical natural law theorists and modern anthropologists, Brunner wrote, both 
agree that the mother’s recognition that a child is hers comes more easily than the 
father’s, given the lengthy pregnancy, arduous child-bearing, and infant nursing 
undertaken by the mother. The father’s recognition of a child is more contingent and 
situational, and males have a stronger tendency toward infidelity, divorce, and 
 
16 See discussion herein of this sexual perfectionist theme in chapter 4 on Augustine by David Hunter and 
chapter 21 on Pope Paul VI by Stephen Pope.  
17 Ibid., 366–67; Dogmatics 2:63–65; Man in Revolt, 348–52. 
18 Justice, 145–47; Divine Imperative, 367–71   
19 Justice, 147; Eros und Liebe, 33, 38–43; see also Dogmatics, 1:205–40 on the doctrine of the Trinity.  
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polygamy. But scientists also agree that most human males recognize and care for their 
offspring more often than other mammalian males do, which says much about what is 
unique about the human species and its reproductive strategy. For Brunner, this human 
distinction reflected the order of nature for human families created by God, and it was 
expressed more fully in the covenantal bonds of enduring and exclusive love that 
become the Christian family.20 
Brunner added something that is often forgotten—the importance of the child’s 
recognition that a given woman and a given man are responsible for its existence. The 
“trinity of recognitions” implied in this bio-existential reality throws mother, father, and 
child together in irrevocable ways, Brunner argued. “Since I, the father, as well as the 
mother and the child, know irrevocably that this fact is irrevocable, then we three 
persons are bound together in a way in which no other three persons have ever been 
bound together, in an unparalleled and indissoluble relation. . . . This trinity of being we 
call the human structure of existence.” This structure of existence is uniquely human not 
only because it is a biological reality but also because it is recognized to be so by all 
three members of the one-flesh union brought together in love. Even separation or 
divorce does not destroy the reality of this bio-existential one-flesh union of mother, 
father, and child. “We cannot ‘break’ love, but we can break faith.”21 
Brunner believed that nature itself, at the human level, both anticipates and is 
completed by God’s intention that husband, wife, and child are united in the marital 
family and remain one flesh together. Jesus himself, in his commentary on Genesis 
2:24, advanced the idea that this one-flesh union should be lifelong: “So they are no 
longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate” 
(Matthew 19:6). In this passage, Brunner argued, Jesus underscored that a Christian 
marriage should be exclusive and enduring. Adding another spouse through polygamy 
not only insults the dignity and equality of husband and wife but also severs the 
essential natural tie between at least one of the parents and some of the children, 
producing inevitable discord and rivalry within the home. “The sexual union must be 
strictly monogamous . . . primarily for the child’s sake.” Similarly, divorcing a spouse and 
taking another when a minor child is still present, though sometimes sadly necessary, 
“is a catastrophe for children,” for it again severs an essential biological tie between one 
parent in the home and the child and destroys the “trinity of recognition” that uniquely 
becomes a Christian household.22  Brunner left unexplored related questions about 
adoption of unrelated minor children and of remarriage by a widowed parent with minor 
children. Following Protestant convention, he likely would have found these acceptable 
alternatives to the ideal form of natural family ties, if not sublime expressions of 
Christian charity. 
 
20 Divine Imperative, 356–69; Man in Revolt, 352–61. On the roots of this view in Thomas Aquinas, see 
Browning, From Culture Wars, 113–24.  
21 Divine Imperative, 346, 360; Eros und Liebe, 38–43. 
22 Justice, 145–47. 
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The Church and the Family in Society 
Brunner recognized a fourth social sphere besides the family, market, and 
state—the sphere of religion, which for him is mainly exemplified by the church in both 
its empirical and ideal forms. The sphere of the church is not directly derived from a 
human psychophysical interest or involuntary natural condition. A person is born without 
choice into a family, participates automatically in the economy, and comes inevitably 
under the jurisdiction of a state as a subject or citizen. By contrast, membership in a 
church or religious community is voluntary in modern society, said Brunner, although 
infant baptism blurs that distinction.23 
Brunner described the church in conventional Protestant terms as “a community 
of believers, in fellowship with God, and founded on the Word of God.” Regardless of 
whether the church is congregational or hierarchical, free or established, a single 
community or a global denomination, Brunner argued, its fundamental task is to preach 
the Word, administer the sacraments, catechize the young, care for the poor and needy, 
and prophesy against injustice. Brunner encouraged the church to maintain internal 
order and moral discipline, but he warned against “false legalism” and Pharisaism in the 
form of an elaborate canon law system or hierarchical church court structure, which he 
thought too reminiscent of medieval Catholicism and too redolent of the structure of the 
modern state. He also warned against the church becoming beholden to the state or too 
involved in state politics.24   
From Brunner’s Protestant theological perspective, each of the spheres of family, 
economy, state, and church deserves a high degree of autonomy from the other 
spheres in pursuing its unique functions, developing its internal logic and ethic, and 
refining its specific strategies. Brunner echoed Dutch theologian and statesman 
Abraham Kuyper in arguing that the social spheres should respect each other’s special 
functions, resist interfering and undermining other spheres, yet also support the other 
spheres in accomplishing their unique goals. Each social sphere has its own 
sovereignty, Kuyper put it. For instance, the market should help the family supply its 
economic needs but should not disturb or distort the family’s intimacy or its goals of 
procreation and nurture. The state should not own or completely control either family, 
market, or church, even though it should assist each to fulfill its special tasks. The 
church should not directly control family, market, or government, although it should 
remind them of their higher moral, social, and covenantal obligations.25   
Catholic subsidiarity theory, exemplified in this volume by Popes Leo XIII and 
John Paul II,26 had a different way of talking about a similar vision of society that we find 
in Protestant covenantal thinkers like Kuyper and Brunner. The Catholic Church 
advanced this theory at the turn of the twentieth century, when the legal and social 
 
23 Divine Imperative, 552–54; Dogmatics, 3:27–37. 
24 Divine Imperative, 539–54. 
25 Ibid. 554. See further chapter 18 herein on Abraham Kuyper. 
26 See chapters 20 and 22 herein on Popes Leo XIII and John Paul II.  
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control of society by the church had been long gone but was threatened to be replaced 
by either the socialist state or the capitalist market. Catholic subsidiarity theory, 
informed as it was by Aristotelian and Thomistic theories of the importance of the goods 
of the natural family and kin altruism, was designed to keep both government and 
market from controlling and thereby undermining the integrity of the increasingly 
embattled domestic sphere. The doctrine of subsidiarity insisted that neither the market, 
through excessive work demands and commercialization, nor the state, through its 
paternalism and control, should undermine the marriage-based family nor undercut the 
church’s special protection and nurture of this institution. In both Protestant and Catholic 
formulations, the state and market had specialized functions, but they had to constrain 
themselves and cooperate in preserving and enhancing a pluralistic society. Much of 
this Brunner absorbed and distilled in his understanding of the place of the family in 
church, state, market, and society.  
What the church offered the family was a support structure at critical stages in a 
family’s life, Brunner argued. The church was the site of weddings, and it was critically 
responsible to prepare a couple for their budding union, instruct them in God’s will for 
marriage and family life, and help them achieve the goods of family life through pastoral 
care, visitation, and support. The church was the site of baptisms, where parents and 
godparents, families and congregations together pledged to love and support and 
nurture the faith and life of this newly baptized Christian. The church was the site of 
catechesis and preaching, where those young in faith learned the ways of God and 
prepared themselves for the full embrace of God and the church in public confirmation 
or profession of faith. The church was sometimes the site of primary education, done in 
coordination with other social institutions, usually including the state. The church was 
the site of diaconal care, which provided widows and orphans, the poor and needy, the 
stranger and sojourner with food, shelter, medical care, and emergency relief, again 
alongside the state and other voluntary associations. And the church was the site of 
funerals, which were critical moments of pastoral care and support as the family 
mourned its losses and rearranged the responsibilities and tended to the needs of those 
family members who were left.27  
The church was also responsible to provide “salt and light” to society at large, to 
exemplify the meaning of love and justice in its own community, and to speak 
prophetically against injustice and oppression. This was especially true in the area of 
sex, marriage, and family life, Brunner argued, which in his day had been rent asunder 
by world wars as well as by modernization and liberalism. Brunner’s remarks about the 
“crisis of marriage and the family” offered shortly after World War II prove keenly 
prescient of the place and plight of the marital family in the twenty-first century:  
The causes of this crisis are many and varied, internal and 
external: the destruction of the economic unity of the family by industrial 
life and the increase in the means of communication, the housing 
problem of our great cities, the economic, social, legal, political, and 
 
27 Dogmatics 3:53–71, 111–21; Divine Imperative, 504–16; 552–61. 
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intellectual emancipation of women, the numerical surplus of women 
[after the war], the invention of contraceptives, and, above all, profound 
spiritual changes which can only be suggested by recalling the use of 
slogans emphasizing the claims of the individual, such as the “rights of 
personality,” or “the freeing of the individual personality from the tutelage 
of collective groups.” Christian society, the Church, and Christian 
theology would be well advised to take the problem of marriage more 
seriously than they have done hitherto. . . . [T]he crisis in marriage 
presents the Christian ethic with the most serious and the most difficult 
problem with which a Christian ethic has to deal. . . . We [are] dealing 
with the very foundations of human existence.28 
Such insights have helped to motivate later Protestants in North America, 
Europe, and, increasingly, the global south to make marriage and family a more central 
part of their ministry and mission. Indeed, as the later chapter herein on Jean Bethke 
Elshtain illustrates, modern Protestants (including the two authors of this chapter) have 
joined with each other and with Catholics, Jews, and other people of faith and good will 
in a modern “marriage movement.”  That movement calls church, state, and society to 
shore up this vital institution of the marital family, even while emphasizing the rights and 
dignity of women, children, singles, and same-sex parties in a way that Brunner would 
not have countenanced.29 
Summary and Conclusions: Barth v. Brunner 
As earlier chapters in this volume have made clear, Christianity has long had a 
double language to address issues of sex, marriage, and family life: (1) a philosophical 
language rooted in reason, nature, custom, and experience that is understandable by 
all, and (2) a theological language rooted in the Bible and revelation that sometimes has 
analogies in other traditions of faith, thought, and belief, including those of secular legal 
theory.  
Emil Brunner offers a good example of a modern Protestant theologian using this 
double philosophical and theological language to analyze the complex institution of the 
marital family. Brunner maintained that reason could discern the human interests 
motivating the spheres or orders of creation, including the order of the marital family. 
But he also believed that human reason alone could not normatively define and properly 
actualize these interests fully without revelation. As a Christian theologian, Brunner was 
not a philosophical foundationalist in asserting that reason can grasp knowledge of 
these interests and spheres. That is, he was not first emptying his mind of the witness of 
the Christian tradition and then using reason to build up, from some empirical or rational 
ground floor, the normative role of marital monogamy in a one-flesh union of father, 
mother, and child. Rather, he was using reason to gain a certain degree of “distance,” in 
 
28 Ibid., 340–41. 
29 See, e.g., Man in Revolt, 347–48 describing homosexuality as “that unnatural, demonic deformation of 
sexuality.”  On children’s rights, however, see Justice, 146–47. 
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contrast to pure objectivity, from the normative tradition that shaped the Christian 
witness. It is through this “distanciation,” as Paul Ricoeur put it, that reason becomes 
capable of discerning some of the rhythms of our natural human sexuality and other 
natural needs that then anticipate and incline us toward covenanted life-long 
monogamy. Furthermore, these forms of distanciated social-scientific reason and 
empirical observation may help us see the beneficial consequences—the goods—that 
flow from this covenantal relation.30  
Thus, for Brunner the theologian, marriage and the family together constituted 
one of the many spheres of society that Christians should order on the basis of God's 
commands in creation. The male-female differentiation of Genesis 1:27, the declaration 
that it is “not good for the man to be alone” (Genesis 2:17), and the command that a 
man leaves “his father and mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh” 
(Genesis 2:24) were features of God’s order of creation for marriage and family. All this 
for Brunner was the marital ideal as seen by the eyes of faith. But he did not stop with 
this. Brunner believed that the fundamental social spheres of life—marriage, 
government, and market—evolved out of basic human interests that could be known 
and analyzed by reason and reflections on natural experience. From the perspective of 
human reason, these spheres function to articulate and meet the needs of all human 
beings, even though, from the perspective of faith, they could be understood to be gifts 
of God in the order of creation.  
By taking this step, however, Brunner also came into conflict with the teachings 
of his immensely influential contemporary and fellow Swiss Reformed theologian, Karl 
Barth. In fact, their disagreements led to a famous debate between them about natural 
law, natural theology, and natural rights. Barth thought that Brunner had sold out to an 
inadequate Roman Catholic theory of natural law. He called Brunner’s idea of orders of 
creation a “horizontal” ethic that had lost contact with the transcendent, particularly the 
Christocentric way of the cross. He once wrote of Brunner: “But we cannot help feeling 
that at the root of his conception of ‘order’ there lies something akin to the familiar 
notion of lex naturae which is immanent in reality and inscribed upon the heart of man, 
so that it is directly known to him.”31   
Unlike Brunner and the Lutheran sources on which he called, Barth did not speak 
directly of estates of nature, let alone the order and ordinances of creation. Barth 
acknowledged occasionally that there were differentiated spheres of life such as family, 
government, and business. He also believed that God’s commands addressed these 
different spheres or orders. But Barth denied that these divine commands contained 
norms, laws, or orders that could be abstracted from God’s command and gain a life of 
their own as independent principles of natural or rational governance. For such views 
 
30 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
59–62. 
31 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 
III/4: 20; see also Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 2002).  
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wrongly bestow norms to marriage and family independently of the direct will of God. 
Marriage and family, Barth taught, receive their normative meaning through the direct 
command of God as revealed in the history of creation, reconciliation, and, most 
definitively, the redemptive activity of Jesus Christ.32 
Barth’s ethic of marriage and the family is riddled with the language of divine 
command. We are commanded to be male or female, but not necessarily to marry. As 
male and female, we are commanded to be in copartnership with one another. God’s 
command means that we can only be man in relation to woman and only woman in 
relation to man.33 This command of God extends to both male-female differentiation and 
male-female relationship: “We have to say both that man is necessarily and totally man 
or woman, and that as such and in consequence he is equally necessarily and totally 
man and woman.”34 Of course, for Barth the language of command is more indicative 
than imperative; it announces our definition and status before God more than it imposes 
an external moral demand. It is, as Ricoeur put it, more gift than arbitrary divine edict.35 
Commands for Barth are intended to free human beings more than to restrict and 
control them. Nonetheless, a command for Barth makes Christian ethics (even in the 
sphere of sex, marriage, and the family) a matter of direct encounter with the Word of 
God and quite independent of the regularities of reason and nature—and of anything 
approaching a theory of natural law.    
Barth, in our view, is wrong in his interpretation of Brunner. Brunner says that 
reason can discern the human interests embedded in the spheres of creation, including 
the order of family and marriage, and can work to improve them so far as possible. 
Christians, therefore, could and should fully engage the whole community on 
fundamental questions of sex, marriage, and family life, and should be involved in the 
thinking, teaching, and policy-making of the state, economy, media, academy, and other 
institutions besides the church that affect the marital family. This is not to deny but to 
affirm that the fuller normative teaching about sex, marriage, and family life is revealed 
in the Bible and in the ongoing testimony of the Spirit of God that helps the church and 
each of its members uncover biblical truth, Brunner believed. Reason helps us 
understand the substructures of the spheres of life. It helps us discern the premoral 
goods that must be properly ordered in human life. It gives us hints about their 
fulfillment. But the ideals and goals of the family and other spheres, according to 
Brunner, are themselves revealed more fully in scripture and are ideally exemplified in 
the church and the lives of its members. And it is just because of this that church 
members must reach out, humbly but insistently, to offer salt and light, examples and 
 
32 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/4: 18–23. 
33 Ibid., 117. 
34 Ibid., 118. 
35 Paul Ricoeur, “The Logic of Jesus, the Logic of God,” Criterion 18, no. 2 (Summer, 1979): 4–6. 
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arguments, prophecy and pastoral care for the marital family, the most fundamental of 
human spheres, “the mother of all earthly ordinances,” as Luther had put it.36 
Barth has none of this kind of thinking in his theology and ethics. For this reason, 
Barth did not enter into dialogue with other perspectives and disciplines on aspects of 
human life such as marriage and the family in the way that Brunner could and did. Barth 
could only confess what he presumed to be the command of God witnessed to in 
scripture and apprehended by faith in the moment. That hermeneutic could work for the 
church or for a principally Christian society that accepts scripture and tradition as the 
foundation for family, economy, state, and church alike. But it is harder to make this 
work in the pluralistic, let alone post-Christian, society that was emerging in the mid-
twentieth century. By claiming too much for the Word of God and the cross of Christ, 
Barth marginalized Christianity from modern discourse about the family and, finally, 
even marginalized his point of view from ongoing deliberations about the family within 
the contemporary church. He inadvertently made some strands of Protestant theology 
increasingly irrelevant to the contemporary church, state, and social debates about the 
meaning of sex, marriage, and the family. Brunner offered a rather different and 
ultimately a more constructive way of engagement. Modern Protestants and many 
others in a post-Christian culture might do well to reread him.  
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